Shooting for neutrality? Analysing bias in terrorism reports in Dutch newspapers by Richard, Thomas
SHOOTING FOR NEUTRALITY? 1 
Analysing bias in terrorism reports in Dutch newspapers 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
Abstract 9 
As with other nations, terrorism is a compelling preoccupation in The Netherlands. One issue within 10 
the public debate concerning news coverage is whether it fairly reports the perpetrators’ racial, ethnic 11 
and religious backgrounds. This article asks whether there is disproportionate attention (coverage 12 
bias), selection (gatekeeping bias) and presentation (statement bias) in various Dutch newspapers 13 
between 2015-2017. Using content analysis, we find that all three types of bias present, albeit to 14 
different degrees. We propose that Critical Race Theory (CRT) usefully explains how bias is often 15 
unintentional and that journalistic outcomes are consequent of unconsciously imprinted ideas about 16 
what constitutes a “terrorist”, facilitated and amplified by institutionalised media practices and wider 17 
societal power relations.  18 
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The terror threat and its wider perceptions  23 
Hoping to ignite a race war by targeting black parishioners, on 17th June 2015, Dylann Roof killed nine 24 
people in a church in Charleston, South Carolina. The incident was covered extensively, including in 25 
the Netherlands, with the type of coverage being also debated particularly on social media. One key 26 
issue was whether Roof should be labelled a “shooter” or “terrorist” (see: Captein, 2015).  27 
 28 
Similar discussions emerged after shootings in Orlando (2016) and Las Vegas (2017) and media outlets 29 
began outlining their policies on covering such incidents, explaining why some labels prevail over 30 
others. The senior editor at the Dutch national public broadcaster NOS argued that the word “attack” 31 
[aanslag] implied premeditation, which in the case of Charleston was unclear. Therefore, NOS chose 32 
“shooting” [schietpartij] instead (see Captein, 2015). 1 Similarly, De Volkskrant’s ombudswoman 33 
argued it was not for a newspaper to determine who should be labelled terrorists. Highlighting 34 
instances where white perpetrators were so identified, she concluded that assumptions that only 35 
Muslims are labelled terrorists is incorrect (Kranenberg, 2015). De Jong (2017) reached a similar 36 
conclusion in NRC Handelsblad. 37 
 38 
One opening premise therefore, is an apparent discrepancy between how news consumers and 39 
newsmakers perceive terror reporting. While the former might detect bias, the latter might disagree, 40 
with both likely to find evidence supporting their case. Therefore, comparative, independent research 41 
into the portrayal of perpetrators from different backgrounds is important. The value of our study also 42 
lies in raising awareness about unintentional bias, which has real consequences. Furthermore, it 43 
addresses feelings of wariness and scepticism towards media beyond our Dutch focus. We introduce 44 
Critical Race Theory (CRT) to the arena of journalism studies, noting that despite disciplinary overlaps, 45 
few scholars have adopted such a lens. While our central aim is to demonstrate how bias is developed 46 
through linguistic practice, we use CRT to explain that such bias is a consequence of societal 47 
conditioning rather than purposeful intent. After outlining our theoretical and methodological 48 
approach, we describe our content analysis findings before discussing their wider implications.  In sum, 49 
our study illustrates how, facilitated and amplified by media practices and wider societal power 50 
                                                            
1 From here on, all translations from Dutch to English are the author’s unless explicitly stated otherwise.  
relations, unconsciously imprinted ideas about what constitutes a “terrorist” can result in reporting 51 
favouring the dominant (white, non-Muslim) majority. 52 
 53 
Understanding bias and conditioning  54 
News bias is the deviation from “accurate, neutral, balanced and impartial” reporting (McQuail, 2000, 55 
p.491), and so news is considered biased when it deviates from what is considered good journalistic 56 
practice. Broadly speaking, bias can be intended and unintended. Intended bias means that journalists 57 
or media organisations purposely present events in certain ways, for example explicitly supporting 58 
particular political parties (partisanship) or favouring certain ideologies (propaganda). Entman (2007, 59 
p.163) terms this ‘distortion bias’. We expect professional journalists would consider this a breach of 60 
the normative ideals of news reporting. Accordingly, we focus on the more complex practice of 61 
unintended bias.  62 
 63 
Unintentional bias (McQuail, 2000, p.491) is not premeditated but is consequent of habits, routines 64 
and social/cultural landscapes. Harder to detect, it influences the selection of news, sources and events 65 
and presentation. Similarly, editorial decision-making often unwittingly determines some events 66 
should receive more coverage than others. This ‘decision-making bias’ (Entman 2007, p.163) reflects 67 
news selection while ‘unwitting’ bias (McQuail, 2000, p.491) or ‘content’ bias (Entman, 2007, p.166) 68 
attends to news presentation. Unintended news bias is the differential treatment of social groups 69 
borne out of journalistic choices without intending to do so.  70 
      71 
Of course, news can never completely reflect reality. That journalism is fully objective is widely 72 
contested by journalists and media scholars, as the extensive literature on framing highlights (see 73 
McLaughlin, 2016). Tuchman (1978) asserts that news presents a “window into the world” (p.1), 74 
showing a glimpse of events, but one determined by the window’s frame, its position and the structure 75 
of its glass. She posits that news is also influenced by professional journalistic standards, organizational 76 
habits and particular social realities and so internal (e.g. news values) and external (e.g. 77 
commercialisation and digitalisation) factors both influence the process of framing (De Vreese, 2002, 78 
p.52). Accordingly, we argue that explanations of bias should move beyond simplistic conclusions that 79 
news organisations are institutionally racist. Instead, we propose that bias is a function of a less 80 
obvious process. While assessing audience reception is beyond our scope here, we see our paper as a 81 
first step in a process of identifying news reporting that has real-life consequences. News reports even 82 
implicitly preferencing white majorities contribute to a wider social conditioning where, as Bonilla-83 
Silva (2014) notes, ethnic minorities suffer every-day disadvantages where they are treated differently, 84 
remunerated differently and offered different opportunities to white citizens. While, for example, 85 
there is a consistent misrepresentation of Muslims, via “reinforcing antagonistic narratives” (Sian et 86 
al., 2012, p.266), it seems reasonable to imagine that exposure to such reports might develop more 87 
extreme and violent reactions.  88 
 89 
Bias, racism and CRT 90 
Scholars identify divisions between ‘old’ and ‘new’ racism. ‘Old’ racism is associated with intended bias 91 
and is generally manifested through promotion of white superiority (Campbell, 1995; Downing and 92 
Husband, 2005). ‘New’ racism (Van Dijk, 2000), also described as ‘institutional’ (Carmichael and 93 
Hamilton, 1967; Downing and Husband, 2005), or ‘modern’ (Entman, 1990), can be resultant of 94 
unconsciously developed ideas and social practice rather than emerging from purposeful ideology 95 
(Delgado and Stefancic, 2012). Manifestations include job applicants with African-American or Arab-96 
sounding names being less likely to be successful, even amongst ‘Equal Opportunity Employers’ 97 
(Panteia, 2015). Our premise is that media professionals, making every effort to be fair and objective, 98 
may not realize that their coverage is a function of unintended socially-conditioned news practice. We 99 
propose that such consequences can be explained by Critical Race Theory (CRT). 100 
 101 
CRT proposes that race/racism is socially constructed. Race is not fixed but dependent on ever-102 
changing social landscapes (Hall 1997) and is resultant of social processes where people construct 103 
boundaries by appointing labels, rather than it being biologically fixed (Baumann, 1999). A further 104 
complication is that ‘race’ is a contributor to human identity that intersects with ethnicity, religion, 105 
gender and nationality. Muslims, for instance, are regularly juxtaposed to a white majority (see Shadid, 106 
2009) but this means comparing a religious entity with a ‘racial’ (ethnic) group. After all, one could be 107 
white and Muslim, or non-white and non-Muslim. The fluidity of these labels depends on outside 108 
acceptance, social context and power (Demmers, 2012). In some situations, aspects of our identity 109 
matter more than others, and the dominant aspects are not solely controlled by the subject. Our 110 
identity therefore does not only relate to how we see ourselves but also how society sees us 111 
(Demmers, 2012). Hence, investigating bias is also a question of social power: who is able to define 112 
and transform group boundaries. In order to recognize news bias, we should determine which social 113 
identities dominate when shooters are identified, who has the power to decide that, and whether this 114 
differs when accounting for the perpetrators’ background.  115 
 116 
This will also address how ‘race’, religion and ethnicity interrelate and become salient through news 117 
coverage, setting boundaries for certain in- and out-groups. The label used to describe someone or 118 
something can serve to create or strengthen a certain in-group (‘us’, the positive) and out-group 119 
(‘them’, the negative) (Reisgl and Wodak, 2001, p.45). It is thus concerned with questions of power as 120 
the majority have the power to define group boundaries and decide who belongs to the in- and out-121 
group.  122 
 123 
CRT and media studies 124 
Integrating CRT and media studies theories is welcomed (Harris, 2012; Bennett Capers, 2015) and 125 
presents opportunities to move beyond legal scholarship (Harris, 2012) and education (Solórzano and 126 
Yosso, 2001; Bernal, 2002) to which CRT is traditionally close. There seems to be growing interest into 127 
(frame) analysis of news coverage of particular minorities amongst CRT-scholars (e.g. Rodríquez, 2007; 128 
Vélez et al., 2008). These studies, feeding off media theories, however, tend to focus on one social 129 
group only (often a minority). Although this highlights trends in the portrayal of certain minorities, it 130 
cannot exclude this being a society-wide phenomenon also affecting the majority. Other more 131 
comparative studies seem to discuss ‘the media’ without acknowledging all its varieties (e.g. Writer, 132 
2002; Corbin, 2017). 133 
 134 
Other media scholars that have focused on the portrayal of terrorism without a CRT-lens (e.g. Powell, 135 
2011; Kearns et al. 2019). In fact, the study by Kearns, Betus and Lemieux (2019, p.18) analysing 136 
coverage of U.S. terrorist attacks found that “attacks by Muslim perpetrators received, on average, 137 
357% more coverage than other attacks”. This emphasizes the timeliness of this topic and the 138 
relevance of this research, which is set within the Dutch context. Focusing on terrorism coverage 139 
remains relevant as language is performative (Demmers, 2012, p.21). The way certain actors are 140 
identified may affect behaviour (Thibodeau and Boroditsky, 2011; Powell, 2011) or feelings towards 141 
them. Although the nature and strength of the effect is debated (see: Scheufele, 1999; Herda, 2010) 142 
framing is said to have at least some influence on news consumers (Van Dijk, 2000; Bhatia, 2005).  143 
 144 
Indeed, focus group respondents evaluated perpetrators differently when labelled “terrorist” or 145 
“freedom fighter” (Montiel and Shah, 2008), and the labels “Islamist” and “terrorist” increased the 146 
length and severity of proposed punishments by respondents when compared to “shooter” (Baele et 147 
al., 2017, p.14). Not only may different labels influence public perception, this also emphasizes the 148 
relevance of investigating the link between religion and terror. 149 
 150 
Framework 151 
In order to assess “racial”, religious and/or ethnic bias in news reports, we adapt the broad analytical 152 
framework developed by D’Alessio and Allen (2000). Originally designed to analyse election campaigns, 153 
the framework categorises bias into coverage, gatekeeping and statement bias. The focus on all three 154 
makes enables conclusions about the scope and variety of news bias. 155 
 156 
Coverage bias relates to news coverage volume (D’Alessio and Allen, 2000), and attends to some actors 157 
or groups receiving more coverage than others, whilst also accounting for factors such as relevance 158 
and newsworthiness (Eberl et al., 2017). Coverage quantity matters because it can influence audience 159 
understandings, as well as how “natural” events appear to them. Measuring this is challenging because 160 
it is difficult to establish how much coverage each actor deserves (Eberl et al. 2017, p.1132). We 161 
therefore focus on the number of articles per case (1) and their length (2), whilst accounting for 162 
similarity between cases and the characteristics of each outlet. A fair balance would entail insignificant 163 
differences between the visibility of the attack(er) in each outlet. 164 
 165 
Gatekeeping bias focuses on information selection (D’Alessio and Allen, 2000). Identifying it is 166 
challenging, since “fairness” can only be determined once the range of stories is known (D’Alessio and 167 
Allen, 2000, p.135). In order to satisfactorily operationalise gatekeeping bias, we focus only on quoted 168 
sources, how much prominence they have and how they are contextualised. This shows who is framing 169 
the attack(er) and directing the debate, and research suggests Dutch news is dominated by white, elite 170 
sources (Van Dijk, 2008) while Muslim experts are asked to comment much less frequently, even when 171 
news stories concern them (Devroe, 2007). Here, we measure the type of source, their frequency as 172 
well as the way they are introduced and contextualised by the journalist, as this may influence their 173 
credibility in front of the reader. 174 
 175 
Finally, statement or tonality bias concerns content presentation (D’Alessio and Allen, 2000; Eberl et 176 
al., 2017), since labels reveal value judgments when describing attackers. Statement bias is detected 177 
by labels (nouns) and descriptions (adjectives) used to describe perpetrators and their actions, 178 
categorising them as positive, neutral or negative. In addition, we count how often ethnicity, “race” 179 
and religion are mentioned, to determine the relevance and fluidity of social identities. Of course, 180 
statement bias can be considered subjective, as it requires both interpretation and categorisation. 181 
However, we mitigate this by applying the same categorisation systematically across cases. 182 
 183 
Sample and method 184 
This research conducts a comparative case study in order to point out the differences between the 185 
portrayal of perpetrators based on specific features. In order to control for potential intervening 186 
variables as far as we can, the cases selected were as similar as possible, apart from the variations in 187 
attacker ethnicity, religion and race. We acknowledge that expanding the sample with more cases and 188 
a longer timespan would benefit generalizability, however, it would be more complex to uphold that 189 
any differences detected were due to varieties in race, religion and ethnicity as the number of 190 
intervening variables would be greater. We therefore use a smaller, more “controlled” sample. We 191 
chose to focus on The Netherlands because of the social debate on biased reporting of terrorism 192 
suspects (see introduction) which is likely to be repeated in the event of another terrorist attack. 193 
Furthermore, many more academic studies have focused on media reports in English, and fewer have 194 
considered Dutch media.   195 
 196 
To account for cultural and geographical proximity, we only consider U.S terror attacks by American-197 
born attackers between 2015 and 2017. Previous media research (Galtung and Ruge, 1965; Phillips, 198 
2015) suggests that geographically closer events generally receive more coverage. Further, events in 199 
countries similar to The Netherlands – with high cultural proximity (Harcup and O’Neill, 2001; Moeller, 200 
1999) – also tend to generate more coverage. Choosing only attacks in the U.S without Dutch victims, 201 
allowed to account for differences in proximity. As death toll or severity could similarly influence the 202 
amount of coverage (Harcup and O’Neill, 2017), we chose cases where the number of casualties was 203 
roughly the same for white, non-Muslim perpetrators (68 deaths in total) as it was for Muslim, non-204 
white perpetrators (63 deaths in total). For similar reasons all cases selected were shootings by male 205 
perpetrators born and raised in the U.S2.  206 
 207 
Finally, attacker motivation was accounted for as much as possible. Although most shooters did not 208 
survive and their motivation remained ambiguous, the common denominator was that each attack 209 
could be considered an act of terrorism. Although there is no universal definition of such an act, 210 
definitions often hinge on premeditated acts of severe violence (1) against random, innocent civilians 211 
(2) for ideological reasons (3) e.g. political, social or religious (see: Ganor, 2002; NCTV, 2016). 212 
Acknowledging that differentiating between terrorist attacks and “regular” shootings is subjective, the 213 
lack of a clear personal link between target and perpetrator was deemed crucial, as was a (potential) 214 
link to ideology. Table 1 summarizes our selected cases: 215 
 216 
Table 1. The terror attacks in our study 217 
Case Perpetrator ‘Race’, Ethnicity, Religion Date Deaths 
Charleston Dylann Roof White, American, Non-Muslim June 17th, 2015 9 
Las Vegas Stephen Paddock White, American, Non-Muslim October 1st, 
2017 
59 
San 
Bernardino 
Syed Rizwan 
Farook 
Non-white, (Pakistani)- 
American, Muslim 
December 2nd, 
2015 
14 
Orlando Omar Mateen Non-white, (Afghan-)American 
Muslim 
June 12th, 2016 49 
 218 
We identified broad patterns within 220 articles from print editions of the four most-read newspapers 219 
in The Netherlands 3. Two of these are ‘popular’ editions (De Telegraaf, Algemeen Dagblad/AD), the 220 
other two ‘quality’ (De Volkskrant, NRC Handelsblad). The popular editions are most widely read, with 221 
a circulation of 382,000 and 318,000 papers respectively, compared to 218,000 (De Volkskrant) and 222 
136,000 (NRC Handelsblad) as of 2016 (SVDJ, 2017). Although the reach of television or online news is 223 
undeniable, newspapers remain important for the Dutch audience (Kanne and Driessen, 2017). 224 
Analysing print newspaper articles therefore covers an important section of the Dutch media 225 
landscape. We conducted a content analysis to identify patterns within coverage, and then looked at 226 
typical examples of these trends to examine more qualitatively what was written in what context to 227 
justify any claim of unintended bias. 228 
 229 
Reporting terror in numbers  230 
Coverage Bias 231 
Table 2 shows that the Orlando attack received almost double the coverage as any other attack (N=92, 232 
41.8%). This is not simply due to the different type of newspaper since each accounts for roughly a 233 
quarter of all articles, with quality newspapers publishing only slightly more (N=122, 55.5%) than 234 
popular ones (N=98, 44.5%). 235 
 236 
 237 
 238 
Table 2. Articles distributed per attack and per newspaper 239 
 240 
                                                            
2 In one case (San Bernardino), there was a male and female perpetrator. Here, the focus was only on the 
portrayal of the male perpetrator in those news stories.  
3 Articles including the name or place of the attack in a 14-day period following the attack were selected. Stories 
that included the name or place of the attack(er) but were not about the act were excluded, as were opinion 
pieces. The sampling was done using LexisNexis and by checking print newspapers.  
Case N % Newspaper N % 
Charleston 34 15.5 Algemeen Dagblad 41 18.6 
Las Vegas 51 23.2 De Telegraaf 57 25.9 
Total white 85 38.6 Total popular 98 44.5 
San Bernardino 43 19.5 NRC Handelsblad 69 31.4 
Orlando 92 41.8 De Volkskrant 53 24.1 
Total non-white 135 61.4 Total quality 122 55.5 
Total 220 100.0 Total 220 100.0 
 241 
Differences between newspapers are only evident in terms of perpetrator background. As Table 3 242 
indicates, popular editions divide their attention most equally, with least coverage given to Charleston 243 
(12.2% in AD; 19.3% in Telegraaf) and most to Orlando (34.1% in AD; 29.8% in Telegraaf – tied with Las 244 
Vegas). The quality editions, however, covered Orlando more extensively; 52.2% of NRC’s total 245 
coverage on all four attacks was dedicated to Orlando, and 47.2% for De Volkskrant. Remaining 246 
coverage was divided fairly equally between the other cases (roughly 18% each). The popular editions 247 
appear more balanced, spending around half of their coverage on non-white attacks (54.1%), versus 248 
45.9% on attacks by white perpetrators. The split within quality newspapers is 67.2% versus 32.8%, 249 
probably mainly due to the high coverage of Orlando. 250 
 251 
Table 3. Articles distributed across newspapers 252 
 253 
Case AD (%) De Telegraaf (%) NRC (%) De Volkskrant (%) 
Charleston 12.2 19.3 13.0 17.0 
Las Vegas 29.3 29.8 15.9 20.8 
San Bernardino 24.4 21.2 18.8 15.1 
Orlando 34.1 29.8 52.2 47.2 
 254 
Table 4 shows the average words per article and indicates that articles covering Charleston and Las 255 
Vegas (Mean=447 and 464 respectively) are shorter than those reporting San Bernardino and Orlando 256 
(Mean=482; 515). This difference is probably explained by the fact that quality newspaper published 257 
more and longer stories on these events, as compared to popular outlets. 258 
 259 
Table 4 Words per article 260 
 261 
Case Mean (no. of words) St. Deviation 
Charleston 447 313 
Las Vegas 464 389 
San Bernardino 482 364 
Orlando 515 372 
   
All cases combined, by newspaper Mean (no. of words) St. Deviation 
AD 359 310 
De Telegraaf 307 187 
NRC 604 391 
De Volkskrant 625 403 
 262 
Entman (1993) suggests that the general concept of news “framing” is developed by highlighting some 263 
elements within a story while marginalising others to construct a particular presentation of people, 264 
events and/or circumstances. Accordingly, the next sections about gatekeeping bias and statement 265 
bias attend to the choices that have been made in terms of how the stories have actually been 266 
reported. 267 
 268 
Gatekeeping Bias 269 
We operationalise gatekeeping bias by analysing sources chosen to support the news narratives. This 270 
illustrates who comments on the news, who frames the attack(er) and who shapes the narrative. Table 271 
5 indicates that the main sources are either other media outlets (22.9%), politicians (17.9%) or 272 
acquaintances of the perpetrators (17.0%). Together, these categories make up over half (57.6%) of all 273 
sources quoted. The religious and ethnic background of the perpetrator are not prominent, although 274 
politicians are quoted more often if the perpetrator is non-white and Muslim.  275 
 276 
Table 5. Sources informing stories 277 
 278 
Type of source Total (%) White, non-Muslim (%) Non-white, Muslim (%) 
Other media  22.9 24.4 21.8 
Politician  17.9 12.2 21.8 
Acquaintance perpetrator 17.0 17.2 16.8 
Security services  9.3 7.8 10.3 
Victim/eye witness  8.6 10.0 7.6 
Public    5.4 7.8 3.8 
Perpetrator   3.2 7.2 0.4 
Other (<5% each)  15.8 13.3 17.6 
Total ≈100.0 ≈100.0 ≈100.0 
 279 
Of course, these data say little about what these sources actually say about the attack(er) but if we 280 
look solely at numbers, Table 5 does not indicate gatekeeping bias. 281 
 282 
Statement bias 283 
We also examined how the attack and attackers were framed, and whether their “racial”, ethnic and 284 
religious identity played a role. Table 6 indicates that race is only prominent in the Charleston case 285 
(41.1%) perhaps explained by the fact that Dylann Roof targeted a black community to begin a race 286 
war. Furthermore, the Dutch translation of “non-white” [niet-blank, niet-witte] is rarely used in 287 
everyday language and when describing a non-white or non-western person, it is more common to 288 
highlight their ethnicity or nationality [e.g. Turkse  Nederlander, persoon met Noord-Afrikaanse roots]. 289 
The word ‘white’ [blank, witte], however, is quite common.  290 
 291 
Table 6. Mentions of race 292 
Case    Named (%) Not Named (%) 
Charleston   41.2 58.8 
Las Vegas  3.9 96.1 
San Bernardino  0.0 100.0 
Orlando   1.1 98.9 
 293 
Table 7 shows that the ethnic background of the attacker is most often not specified. However, when 294 
it is, this is more likely in articles concerning non-white perpetrators (26.7%). Arguably, this is because 295 
the San Bernardino and Orlando attackers have different ethnicity and it was more likely these should 296 
be highlighted. However, all perpetrators were U.S-born and raised, and so it is questionable whether 297 
ethnicity is relevant at all. This indicates a tendency to emphasise the ethnic background of non-298 
Westerners. 299 
 300 
 301 
 302 
Table 7. Mentions of ethnicity 303 
 304 
Case    Named (%) Not Named (%) 
Charleston   8.8 91.2 
Las Vegas  3.9 96.1 
San Bernardino  27.9 72.1 
Orlando   26.1 80.4 
 305 
Religion – especially Islam – seems increasingly used to differentiate between white majorities and 306 
non-white minorities (see Shadid, 2009). Because in three out of our four cases the shooter died and 307 
religious affiliations were not easily confirmed, we counted any suggestions that perpetrators had 308 
religious associations. Table 8 shows that over half of the articles about San Bernardino (60.5%) and 309 
almost half about Orlando (43.5%) mentioned religion, as compared to 7.8% about Las Vegas and none 310 
about Charleston. 311 
 312 
Table 8. Mentions of religion 313 
 314 
Case    Named (%) Not Named (%) 
Charleston   0.0 100.0 
Las Vegas  7.8 92.2 
San Bernardino  60.5 39.5 
Orlando   43.5 56.5 
 315 
Considering the fluidity of social identities, it is also worth examining how often religion and ethnicity 316 
are mentioned simultaneously. Indeed, of 36 articles about San Bernardino and Orlando mentioning 317 
the attacker’s ethnicity, 33 also mentioned his religion (91.7%). And half the 66 times religion was 318 
mentioned, ethnicity was too (50.0%).4 This strengthens the connection between terrorism, being 319 
‘foreign’ and Muslim. More widely, this furthers ideas of an in-group (a white majority) and an out-320 
group (a non-Western, Islamic minority), and not only highlights how religious and ethnic social 321 
identities intersect, but also how such group boundaries can become salient. 322 
 323 
We also examined other labels describing the attacker. For simplicity, we grouped codes into 324 
“negative”, “neutral” or “positive”. Negative labels for example, included “terrorist”, as well as those 325 
clearly linked to terrorist organisations (e.g. “ISIS-supporter”, “KKK-member”). Other categories 326 
included are “racist”, “extremist” and “fundamentalist”. Non-judgemental, neutral labels included 327 
“perpetrator”, “shooter” or “attacker”. Also included, more contentiously, are neutral labels 328 
emphasising race, ethnicity or religion (“Muslim” or “American”). We operationalise positivity by 329 
coding labels emphasising the attacker’s “normality”. Examples include family- or work-related labels 330 
such as “father” or “colleague”. These labels humanise perpetrators, making it easier for audiences to 331 
identify with them. Table 9 shows that most labels are neutral, regardless of the perpetrator’s 332 
background (all between roughly 60% and 70% of occasions). Only the Las Vegas shooter was described 333 
more positively (16.3% versus 3.8%-9.2%).  334 
 335 
 336 
 337 
 338 
 339 
 340 
 Table 9. Perpetrator labels 341 
Case Negative (%) Neutral (%) Positive (%) Total  
                                                            
4 As can been seen when comparing tables 8 and 9 with table 10 
Charleston 28.8 67.5 3.8 ≈100.0 
Las Vegas 10.5 73.3 16.3 ≈100.0 
White, non-Muslim 19.3 70.5 10.2 ≈100.0 
     
San Bernardino 24.4 69.8 5.8 ≈100.0 
Orlando 31.4 59.5 9.2 ≈100.0 
Non-white, Muslim 28.9 63.2 7.9 ≈100.0 
 342 
Table 10 shows how we nuanced “negative” labels. When data are grouped, the idea that Muslim 343 
perpetrators are more likely to be called “terrorists” has some value. For San Bernardino, 76.2% of 344 
negative labels were terrorism-related compared to 50.0% for Orlando. This was much less for 345 
Charleston (14.3%) or Vegas (11.1%). 346 
 347 
Within Las Vegas reports, the “lone-wolf” label was dominant, often combined with references to 348 
mental illness (altogether 88.9% of negative labels)5. The Charleston attacker – perhaps the best fit 349 
within definition of terrorism – was instead mainly identified as a “racist” or “white supremacist” 350 
(47.6%). This illustrates how terrorism labels can be avoided for one group and be much more common 351 
for another.  352 
Table 10. Nuancing ‘terror’ labels (perpetrator) 353 
 354 
Case Terrorism (%) Lone Wolf (%) Mentally Ill (%) Other (%) Total 
Charleston 14.3 23.8 14.3 47.6 ≈100.0 
Las Vegas 11.1 55.6 33.3 0.0 ≈100.0 
White, non-Muslim 13.3 33.3 20.0 33.3 ≈100.0 
      
San Bernardino 76.2 4.8 4.8 14.3 ≈100.0 
Orlando 50.0 20.8 8.3 20.8 ≈100.0 
Non-white, Muslim 58.0 15.9 7.2 18.8 ≈100.0 
 355 
Table 11 confirms that ascribing such labels is not random, and that both perpetrator and attack are 356 
more often labelled ‘terror(ism)’ when the attacker is non-white and Muslim. This is especially true for 357 
San Bernardino, where 25.0% of reports used the terrorism label at least once6 versus only 1.1% of 358 
articles on Las Vegas and 4.4% on Charleston. This hints at implicit statement bias, even if the attacks 359 
were mainly described using ‘non-terrorism’ vocabulary.  360 
 361 
 362 
 363 
 364 
 365 
 366 
 367 
 368 
 369 
Table 11. Nuancing ‘attack’ labels 370 
 371 
                                                            
5 It is recognized that the sample size has become rather small and should therefore be assessed with caution. 
In order to substantiate the findings follow-up research is welcomed.  
6 Each label used to describe the attack was coded only once, even when used multiple times. This table 
therefore only shows how many articles included a label, not the prominence of one label compared to another 
within each article. 
Label Charleston (%) Las Vegas (%) San Bernardino (%) Orlando (%) 
Terrorism 4.4 1.1 25.0 11.3 
Attack 20.6 16.9 26.0 27.4 
Murder 23.5 4.5 0.0 4.2 
Shooting 13.2 34.9 23.0 22.0 
Bloodbath 11.8 22.5 11.0 13.7 
Act/deed 8.8 4.5 3.0 6.0 
Other (<10%) 17.6 15.7 12.0 15.5 
 ≈100.0 ≈100.0 ≈100.0 ≈100.0 
 372 
Beyond the numbers 373 
Our content analysis reveals patterns within articles, but numbers reveal little about the contextual 374 
meaning of labels and descriptions. Therefore, we used these patterns to further investigate news 375 
discourses in our news sample.  376 
 377 
For example, Stephen Paddock, the white killer of 59 people in Las Vegas was generally described 378 
either neutrally or positively, using non-terrorism terminology. One NRC headline describes Paddock 379 
as a “quiet pensioner, who gambled a lot and ate a burrito every now and then” (NRC, 03/10/17). Apart 380 
from mentioning Paddock by name, the article includes the labels “perpetrator”, “brother”, 381 
“pensioner” and “accountant”. These words emphasise Paddock’s normality and that he was an 382 
ordinary man who like many others, enjoyed a snack every now and then. Perhaps because this does 383 
not explain his extraordinary behaviour he is – when described negatively – portrayed as a “maniac”, 384 
“emotionally unstable” (AD, 04/10/17), and a “lone-wolf” who “must have lost it” (Volkskrant, 385 
03/10/17). This highlights the exceptionality of Paddock’s actions and weakens notions that he may 386 
have been ideologically motivated. Of course, when violent actions are connected to a mental illness 387 
or inexplicable motivations, the wider societal conditioning proposed by CRT are seemingly side-lined, 388 
and the systematic, structural, and culturally constructed news practices remain unexplored, and 389 
therefore unchallenged.  390 
 391 
Similarly, Dylann Roof is appointed a terrorism label in only three articles. Rather, he is labelled a white 392 
supremacist or racist, his act a hate-crime, mass murder or shooting.  One newspaper headline after 393 
the attack read: “Hate crime white apartheid supporter in ‘black church’ shocks United States” (De 394 
Telegraaf, 19/06/15). Although this labelling is negative, Roof is identified as a racist, rather than 395 
terrorist, despite Roof acknowledging his attack as ideologically motivated, which in itself could be an 396 
incentive to ‘safely’ use the terrorism-label. What this suggests is a distinction between white 397 
supremacy/violent racism and terrorism, where both cannot be used simultaneously.  398 
 399 
In contrast, De Volkskrant’s opening paragraph after Omar Mateen killed 49 people in Orlando 400 
identifies him as “the terrorist of Orlando” who had visited the local mosque before shooting 49 people 401 
in Orlando (15/06/16). De Telegraaf starts by saying that Mateen was “29 years old, child of Afghan 402 
parents” (15/06/16). Only in the third paragraph of the article is mentioned that he “was born in New 403 
York in 1986 and lived over 10 years in Florida” (ibidem). It is worth considering the mental blueprint 404 
of a terrorist. This is generally not a quiet pensioner, but a young, emotionally unstable Muslim male, 405 
whose family comes from a country often linked with terrorism. It is worth considering how the 406 
coverage analysed here reinforces this stereotype. 407 
 408 
 409 
 410 
 411 
Discussion 412 
While our analysis shows subtle bias in terrorism reports, the question is why this occurs. Is it, as CRT 413 
suggests, because of unconscious social conditioning and the social practice of media institutions – and 414 
therefore a result and reflection of power relations?  415 
 416 
As we have mentioned, selecting ‘the news’ depends on numerous internal and external factors (De 417 
Vreese, 2005). What is considered important to report depends on the social conventions of what 418 
news should be (Tuchman, 1978; Harcup and O’Neill, 2017). This consensus centres around news value 419 
theory that events must contain characteristics such as exceptionality, proximity and severity (Phillips, 420 
2015; Harcup and O’Neill, 2017). But news value theory does not satisfactorily explain why the Orlando 421 
attack, which claimed 49 victims and took place in a night club, received more coverage than the Las 422 
Vegas attack, which despite being similar in nature (at a concert) and severity (59 killed), received less 423 
coverage. Even if we consider the possibility that there was less major news deserving coverage around 424 
the time of the Orlando attack, and conversely, other events may have dominated news agendas 425 
around the time of the Las Vegas-attack. Scrutinising the events at the time of both attacks7 suggests 426 
that neither is the case.  427 
 428 
Events can also become news simply because they fit into existing interests of media audiences 429 
(Harcup and O’Neill, 2017). Dutch newspaper agencies are, alike many others worldwide, operating in 430 
an increasingly commercialising landscape. Indeed, research into print and online editions of Dutch 431 
newspapers shows that when selecting stories, editors are influenced by audience ‘clicks’ even if this 432 
practice clashes with their professional standards as journalists (Welbers et al., 2015). If news media 433 
are more likely to provide stories that find favour with their core audience, these in turn might simply 434 
perpetuate the type of social system that creates and encourages the news bias we identify.  While as 435 
Rosenwald (2017) suggests news has value “beyond clicks”, some might argue that nonetheless, they 436 
might still function as an “up-or-down vote” of reader interest in a particular story which can then be 437 
realised in terms of advertising revenue.  438 
 439 
But not only do news organisations need to satisfy audiences to remain financially viable, according to 440 
the theory of political economy, news stories are subject to many other shaping factors. What Shaw 441 
(2015, p.121) defines as “a chain of production and distribution processes and structures” that news 442 
travels through before reaching the reader can include the circumstances of ownership, advertising 443 
funding, available sources, political patronage and so on. 444 
 445 
In the case of Orlando, the increased in stories may have been because of the potential link to IS, the 446 
war in Syria and Muslim-extremism in Europe which was fiercely debated at the time. Because it was 447 
already part of the social debate, newspapers may have decided to cover such an attack more 448 
extensively. The Orlando attack fits into a terror-frame that was already a topic of concern at the time, 449 
while the extensive coverage in turn amplified its importance to the reader and helped solidify this 450 
frame. This is not unimportant as the more often a particular frame is used, the more natural it 451 
becomes to the reader and the less probable its use is challenged (also known as ‘frame resonance’, 452 
see: Benford and Snow, 2000). 453 
 454 
We advance this idea within our discussion about gatekeeping bias. Bias can develop because power-455 
holding demographics tend to be able to promote a particular world view more often positive towards 456 
their own in-group (Van Dijk 2008, p.56). Our analysis however, indicates reality is more complex. Our 457 
initial findings show that the types of sources mentioned are similar for all attacks, regardless of the 458 
shooter’s background.  459 
                                                            
7 In the weeks after Las Vegas other topics were the death of the mayor of Amsterdam, Catalonia’s effort 
towards succession and the coalition agreement. In the weeks after Orlando, these were the murder of UK 
politician Jo Cox and an alleged rape victim’s return from Qatar. 
It should be noted, however, that politicians, as primary definers, are often given the opportunity to 460 
comment, and what they say is often unchallenged because of their position (Hall et al., 2013). Through 461 
this mechanism, politicians can transfer their own (un)intentional bias to the audience. Interventions 462 
from Donald Trump for example, are especially insightful. The prominence of religion and ethnicity in 463 
both San Bernardino and Orlando-cases may at least in part be explained by the regular statements by 464 
Trump, a presidential candidate at that time. In one report after the attack in Orlando, De Telegraaf 465 
(13/06/16) wrote that Trump wanted action against  “jihadist terror” and “radical Islam”, suggesting a 466 
link between the attack and terrorism. Similarly, he called for a “total and complete stop of all Muslims 467 
entering the country” after the San Bernardino attack (NRC, 08/12/15). 468 
 469 
Accordingly, Trump specified Islam as particular part of the problem. This not only strengthens the idea 470 
that terrorism is “naturally” linked to Islam, but also that this type of terror is not American. Trump 471 
could have advocated action against domestic terrorism, since Mateen was American, but instead he 472 
highlighted the perpetrators’ ethnic and religious identity. A distorted picture of events therefore can 473 
prevail, because a prominent person holds a particular view. Even when Trump’s views were countered 474 
by Barack Obama or Hillary Clinton, this mainly served to generate debates about immigration and 475 
banning ‘foreign’ Muslims. Hence, the notion of objectivity and neutral reporting which gives voice to 476 
all sides as a key feature of good journalism does not simply remove implicit bias, rather the journalistic 477 
practice of including prominent elite sources as an unwritten rule helps maintain this and keeps certain 478 
frames intact.   479 
 480 
Although many journalists are aware of this, resisting using such sources is problematic. Particularly in 481 
the contemporary digital news environment, they are under pressure to deliver content quickly which 482 
means there is less time to investigate the complexities of major events (Richardson, 2007). Easy-to-483 
obtain accredited sources providing instant, newsworthy soundbites are often the path of least 484 
resistance. Including prominent, elite sources is also common journalistic practice, and politicians and 485 
their employees increasingly understand how the media operates and how to use this to their 486 
advantage (Phillips, 2015). In all probability, Trump and his PR department are aware that controversial 487 
statements will make headlines. Hence, the detected gatekeeping bias can be accounted for not only 488 
by the views of Trump or other politicians, but also by the pyramid of power in society. Whoever has 489 
power, organisational and/or financial means is able to ensure their inclusion in the media debate – 490 
something that is facilitated by the structure of the media environment.  491 
 492 
Besides politicians, perpetrator acquaintances also contributed, and we found the same source was 493 
often quoted repeatedly by different outlets. Again, this might be explained by pressure, verification 494 
and accessibility. Not everyone for example, would want to be identified as related to a mass killer. In 495 
addition, if an outlet is not able to get the ‘scoop’ (Schlesinger, 1987, p.51), it is not unusual to follow 496 
up on the work of others creating a parallel story that is only slightly different (Phillips, 2015). 497 
Consequently, those acquaintances able to comment may be quoted at length, repeatedly, and across 498 
multiple outlets. Not only does the inclusion of similar sources present a way for bias to transfer and 499 
spread, we found it can also migrate from platform to platform. Furthermore, the same sources 500 
repeating the same comments contributes to normalising a particular version of events. Implicit bias, 501 
then, is substantiated and reproduced. This is further amplified by the use of foreign news agencies 502 
who draw up reports widely distributed around the world. It also shows the complexity of the framing 503 
process from the politician’s words, to the news agencies, to the (translated) reports written up by 504 
Dutch journalists. 505 
 506 
While the information selected as news provides one dimension within our analysis, how this news is 507 
presented adds another. We found that although all perpetrators were most often described in neutral 508 
terms, when the labelling was negative there was a stronger link with terrorism when the perpetrator 509 
was non-white and Muslim. Meanwhile, white, non-Muslim attackers were generally described using 510 
non-terrorism terms. In addition, ethnic and religious roots only played a role in those stories about 511 
non-white Muslims.  512 
 513 
An obvious explanation may be the aim to report accurately. Including details describing the attacker’s 514 
ethnic and religious background could reasonably have been considered relevant to the story and since 515 
our sample only included U.S.-born perpetrators, they might have simply been described as 516 
“American”. This also shows that judging relevance is generally done by those representing the 517 
majority whether they be politicians appointing labels or journalists deciding on accuracy. This of 518 
course, does not necessarily reflect how minorities see themselves (Demmers, 2012). 519 
 520 
Because news generally has to be comprehensible, short and compelling for mass audiences, it seems 521 
reasonable to relate it to the beliefs and standards shared by those audiences “establishing common 522 
ground for communication” (Golding and Elliot, 2009, p.644). Journalists therefore tap into already 523 
familiar cultural and social conventions. On one hand, newsmakers often must do this to make complex 524 
events understandable. On the other hand, early reports about terrorist attacks are especially prone 525 
to bias. In the first days after the Orlando attack for example, is was suggested that the perpetrator 526 
was a radicalised Muslim who had probably sympathised with Islamic State. The attack in Charleston, 527 
on the other hand, was quickly defined as racism, right-wing extremism and white supremacy.  528 
Although both attacks could have been labelled terrorism, only one was. They connected to two 529 
separate and established narratives to which readers could relate - the Muslim-terrorist from the 530 
Middle East, and a home-grown right-wing white supremacist. Embedding events within a broader 531 
context to ensure “common ground” can thus result in and substantiate (unintended) stereotypical 532 
ideas of what a terrorist really is.  533 
 534 
How can such standards become assumed and established? Perhaps – adding further support to our 535 
social conditioning thesis – this might be explained by newsroom demographics. Dutch newspapers 536 
for example, are dominated by white, non-Muslim male. As of 2015, only 3% of workers within the 537 
country’s nine largest newsrooms had a non-western background8 while a fair reflection of society 538 
would mean this should be at least 12% (Takken, 2015). When a homogenous world view prevails in 539 
the newsroom, ideas about who is and who is not a terrorist can unknowingly influence reporting. We 540 
argue that even unwittingly, the reliance on, and lack of challenge to a “reservoir of stored cultural 541 
meanings” (Schudson, 1995, p.40) goes a considerable way to explain the statement bias we identify. 542 
This is further supported by the fact that both De Volkskrant and NRC have adopted guidelines on the 543 
use of the terrorism-label – seemingly aware of its contentious use – yet in practice do not appear to 544 
apply these labels impartially.  545 
 546 
Conclusion  547 
We have investigated whether in Dutch newspapers, the perpetrators of American terror attacks are 548 
portrayed differently when considering their religious, racial and ethnic background. We found some 549 
important differences in the portrayal of non-white, Muslim and white, non-Muslim perpetrators. This 550 
bias manifest itself in different ways, often subtly. For example, more articles were published about 551 
non-white, Muslim perpetrators, but only about Orlando in quality newspapers. Also, even though the 552 
sources quoted were similar, non-white, Muslim perpetrators were more often described as terrorists, 553 
as compared to their white equivalents (who were more often described in non-terrorism terms, even 554 
when addressed negatively). Finally, religion and ethnicity were prominent in articles on non-white, 555 
Muslim perpetrators, and these labels were often simultaneously mentioned, strengthening the link 556 
between Islam, “foreign” and “terrorism”. 557 
 558 
                                                            
8 Meaning they had at least one parent born in Asia, Latin American of Africa (excluding the former Dutch 
Indies and Japan). 
We argue that our findings can be largely explained by Critical Race Theory. This considers racism – 559 
here operationally defined as ‘bias’ – as consequent of unconsciously imprinted ideas and social 560 
practices. We have illustrated how news values, journalistic habits and power relations in society 561 
influence news reports on terrorism, even amid aims to report neutrally and indiscriminately. We wish 562 
to be clear that we do not believe the institutions and journalists in our study to be inherently racist, 563 
but instead assert that, like many members of society, they operate according to unconscious and 564 
unintended preconceptions.  565 
 566 
Of course, more research embracing other cases might further substantiate our findings. It remains 567 
difficult to conclude with certainty that news is being reported in a certain way due to the perpetrator’s 568 
background and not something else. Combining media analysis and CRT however, proved helpful in 569 
this regard. More widely, we hope to have opened the possibilities for using CRT outside its usual 570 
arena. We believe our findings are also significant for those who select and report news as they 571 
indicate the benefit of re-evaluating particular journalistic habits that may have unintended and 572 
potentially catastrophic consequences. That these practices and outcomes are unintended does not 573 
mean media practitioners cannot counter these practices or should not feel a responsibility to do so. 574 
Small changes, such as the make-up of the newsroom or discussion about our “reservoir of stored 575 
cultural meanings” (Schudson, 1995, p.40), can make serious differences. The key point is that 576 
potentially neutral practices can, in reality, generate bias. Journalism is difficult, and our objective has 577 
been to identify tendencies within news reports. Only when such tendencies are identified can 578 
responsibility to change them be taken and some extreme and deadly reactions be avoided.   579 
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